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LEGAL R!GHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Neil MacCormick. Oxford: Clarendon
Press. 1982. Pp. x, 272. $29.95.
Social democracy, as understood and defended by Professor Neil
MacCormick, 1 represents a middle ground between the political
philosophies of classical Liberal individualism and Marxist socialism. Classical Liberalism protects abstract legal liberty, but permits
economic disparities among individuals which may undercut concrete freedom of choice. Marxist socialism addresses the economic
realities of industrial society, but often at the expense of individual
liberty. Social democracy attempts a synthesis. It is a theory of
political organization in which the state provides individuals with
maximum equal liberty subject to the constraint of economic fairness
embodied in a program of distributive justice.
Legal Right and Social Democracy is a revised collection of previously published essays. MacCormick deals with broad issues such as
"Law and Economics," "Civil Liberties and the Law'' and "Law,
Obligation and Consent." He also treats the nature of rights and
duties on the narrower, individual level of contract and tort in essays
such as "Voluntary Obligations" and "The Obligation of Reparation.'' The essays draw on and critique the works of philosophers
past and present. MacCormick discusses the theories of Lord Stair,
John Locke and Adam Smith. He attempts to define his ideas on
rights and political obligation in relation to those of John Rawls and
Ronald Dworkin.2
This diversity of subject matter makes it difficult to follow, if not
to find, MacCormick's thesis. His arguments do not clearly build on
each other from chapter to chapter. This can be disconcerting and
confusing to readers without a solid background in political theory.
The essays do, however, contain related themes. What MacCormick
wishes to emphasize is that human beings have rights and that these
rights are best satisfied under societal conditions of maximum equal
liberty and economic fairness.
Assuming MacCormick is correct in asserting that social democracy is responsive to individual rights of liberty and material equality, he still must perform the primary and more difficult task of·
establishing why human beings have a moral claim to these rights.
1. Neil MacCormick is Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at the University of Edinburgh.
2. MacCormick devotes an entire chapter to a critique of John Rawls' A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971), and another chapter to an analysis of Ronald Dworkin's TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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For example, MacCormick asserts a "debt of justice" owed by the
rich to the poor (p. 15), although it is far from clear how this debt
arises.
MacCormick does not rely on a theory of natural rights. Natural
rights, he argues, make "unsustainable ontological assumptions
about the existence of objective and rationally discoverable principles of right" (p. 54). MacCormick also rejects John Rawls' contractual basis for rights although MacCormick's conception of social
democracy is obviously akin to Rawls' "two principles of justice."3
MacCormick develops a convincing critique of Rawls' contract
approach. He points out that the hypothetical conditions of fairness
imposed on society members constrain their deliberations in a way
that is favorable to the adoption of Rawls' principles of justice.
MacCormick further doubts the propriety of deriving principles of
justice from hypothetical contractual situations. Instead, he believes
that principles of justice should be assessed by reference to the practical consequences of their adoption in much the same way a judge
might decide a case on the basis of policy implications.
This hardly provides a moral basis for social democratic principles such as the redistribution of wealth. The strength of Rawls'
work is that it attempts to provide moral justification for the principles of justice. MacCormick finds this justification lacking, but does
not improve on or supplant it. It may appear socially desirable (to
some) to redistribute wealth, but MacCormick must make redistribution take the form of a m9ral imperative.
MacCormick fares better in providing moral and legal bases for
rights in his discussion of interpersonal relationships on the individual, rather than societal, level. He argues that voluntary or contractual obligations arise independently of legal rules. For
MacCormick, the rules of contract are most aptly described as a formal response to the moral implications of promising and inducing
reliance on the part of the promisee. In tort, moral and legal obligations of reparation to injured parties do not depend on the state of
mind of the person committing the injury, but on the right of the
injured party to be secure in his or her person and possessions.
These moral and legal rights in contract and tort are well recognized. But, if MacCormick's discussion does not break new ground,
it does nicely work through some of the theoretical underpinnings of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. However, MacCormick gets into
trouble when he attempts to extend the obligation of reparation to
illustrate how it comports with his ideal of distributive justice.
3. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971). Rawls believes that people under hypothetical conditions of fairness would choose principles of maximum equal liberty and distributive justice to govern their political society. Because these principles are chosen under
conditions of fairness they possess a moral claim to obedience.
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MacCormick would impose an obligation on society to provide
for individuals injured through no one's fault. But how does this
obligation follow from the obligation of reparation? The obligation
of reparation is triggered by an individual's breach of the duty of
care - the correlative of the injured party's right to personal
security. In the case of a person crippled by disease, for example, no
duty has been violated. There is no right of reparation unless one
assumes that society owes the individual a "debt of justice." But this
is exactly what MacCormick has failed to establish.
In the end, MacCormick must rely on his own theories of property rights and human nature to justify the adoption of social democratic principles. These theories, while attractive, are ultimately
contestable and will not persuade those who do not accept MacCormick's personal moral views.
MacCormick adopts the Kantian position that human beings
must be respected as ends in themselves. It is this moral view that
informs his advocacy of social democracy. The conditions of respect
for human beings must include the liberty to pursue one's own conception of the good and a claim to a fair share of material wealth.
According to MacCormick, to be human is to be free to define life
plans for oneself and to enjoy a degree of material well-being to, at
least, entertain such plans. These rights are intrinsic to our moral
status as human beings and command the respect of the state. In this
sense, the state owes a "debt of justice" to its citizens.
MacCormick's argument is subject to internal and external attack. First, one may believe that human beings have a right to liberty and economic fair shares and still wish to dispute that it is the
duty of the state, as opposed to private organizations, to secure these
rights. For example, MacCormick believes that children have a right
to the best possible education; however, he admits that it is unclear
who - parents, church, local authority, or central government owes the duty of providing that education (p. 163).
More fundamentally, the moral view that human beings should
be treated as ends is open to question. One may adhere to a system
of utilitarian ethics in which the ultimate good is to maximize the
total aggregate of happiness in society. Instead of believing that
each individual should be accorded maximum equal liberty and economic fair shares, utilitarians would be morally committed to unequal liberty and large disparities in wealth if it could be shown that
such a state of affairs would maximize total happiness.
MacCormick recognizes that he cannot convince everyone of his
position. He states that, "[o]ne cannot believe in the category 'moral
rights' unless one· accepts in some form the principle that sentient
beings ought to be respected as ends in themselves" (p. 161). That
principle, part of the Kantian and Millian tradition, will appeal to
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many with whom it is productive to enter into moral discourse. Legal Right and Social .Democracy provides a forum for this discourse.

Unfortunately, the disjointed nature of this collection of essays is
such that clearer resolution of questions of right and social democracy will have to await a more sustained and focused work.

